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2Abstract
• It is possible and desirable to consider many human spaceflight scenarios within
many possible long term NASA budget contexts
• Reconnaissance in many directions
• Not necessary to firmly know the eventual direction to define the
boundaries of life cycle costs
• Situational awareness
• Will show:
• Not necessary to define every part of a scenario
• A scenario exploration strategy of “that which remains”; i.e., consistency
• Merger of well-defined portions of content with well defined context as
scenarios provides valuable insights for “that which remains”
• Defines the necessary affordability and productivity characteristics of “that
which remains”
3Introduction
• The NASA Budget since 2003
• Context for any content
• Importance to understand past funds flow to understand possible futures
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4Introduction
• The NASA Budget since 2003
• NASA’s budget has increased on average 1.175% per year since 2003
• NASA’s purchasing power has declined 15% from 2003 to 2015
• The end of the operational portion of NASA’s Space Shuttle program freed up
for other purposes $860M in 2013, two years after the Shuttle last flight, and
less, $360M a year by 2015; heading to zero funds freed up
• Operational funds have remained operational –near to the dollar
• Standing capability / Space Flight Support costs more visible after the end of
the Shuttle program
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5Introduction
• The future of ISS
2015 NASA Budget
• ISS Operations ~ $1.2 billion a year
• ISS R&D, the use of the ISS ~ $300 million a year
• ISS Cargo & Crew, Transportation and Related ~ $2.4 billion a year
Total International Space Station = ~ $3.9 billion a year
• NASA ISS formal commitment through 2024
• Possibly “fine” through 2028
• After ISS? Private space stations - “we can just buy these services” from 
private sector space stations; “anchor tenant”
The Future of ISS = the Future of NASA’s Presence in Low Earth Orbit
6Introduction
• Three factors drive the development of quantifiable NASA human spaceflight
scenarios looking to the next decade
• Choices, pressures, technical and non-technical factors (economics,
demographics, politics, societal trends and constraints, etc.) will affect specific
content
• BUT-all the content and their interactions will manifest itself inside broad
scenarios that are all about context
1. The growth rate of the NASA budget
2. The rate of cost inflation for the aerospace goods and services NASA
acquires
3. The future of the International Space Station (ISS), or more broadly, the
degree to which a human presence in low Earth orbit (LEO) persists in the
NASA portfolio
7Scenario Variable 1: NASA’s Purchase Power
• Locating the edges of the box
High Purchase Power Scenario: Average
NASA budget increases 2016 forward are the
same rate as the average cost inflation of the
exploration & operations goods and services.
(Both 2.5%).
Why “High”? A “what-if”, the NASA budget,
increasing faster than supported by recent
historical data.
Nominal Purchase Power Scenario: The
NASA budget goes up yearly as it has in the
past decade (1.175%). Cost inflation as
officially recommended in the NASA Inflation
Index (2.5%).
Why “Nominal”? Both budget and inflation
rate increases supported by historical trend
data or official NASA sources. No “what-if”.
Low Purchase Power Scenario: The cost
inflation of goods and services required by
NASA increases an additional 1% above the
recommended NASA Inflation Index (3.5%).
NASA yearly budget increases per recent
historical data (1.175%).
Why “Low”? A “what-if”, cost inflation,
increasing faster than supported by official
NASA sources.
8Scenario Variable 2: Post-ISS Budget Availability
• Locating the edges of the box
High post-ISS 
Available 
Funding 
Scenario:
Why “High”? A “what-if”, funding freed-up for other uses post-ISS, disregarding wholly the 
possibility of any continued NASA presence in LEO.
• Exception: ISS Operations as with Nominal (Mission Operations & Control).
Sum=$3,100M a year fully available
Nominal 
post-ISS 
Available 
Funding 
Scenario:
Why “Nominal”? An extrapolation consistent with NASA statements.
• ISS Operations: 1/3rd fully available, while other 2/3rds also available, but limited to use 
for (1) Mission Operations & Control for Exploration and (2) Mission Operations & 
Management of NASA personnel aboard private LEO stations. ($400M a year fully 
available)
• ISS R&D: Reduced 50% ($150M a year fully available)
• ISS Cargo & Crew: Reduced 50% (private stations, NASA as “anchor tenant”); Station 
owner handles in-their space operations and control. Reduction due to either less usage 
and/or bundling/block services consistent with “services”.
Sum=$1,750M a year fully available
Low post-ISS 
Available 
Funding 
Scenario:
Why “Low”? As with Nominal, but “what-if” ISS Cargo & Crew rides and related for a private 
space station in an anchor tenant role are reduced only 1/3rd from current levels. R&D 
remains at the same levels as today, but as NASA work occurring at private sector stations.
Sum=$1,500M a year fully available
9Combining Scenario Variables
• Examples
• The low and nominal post-ISS funding scenarios, combined with the nominal
budget/inflation scenario, frees up zero (or negative) funding by the 2030’s
• The high post-ISS funding scenarios, combined with the nominal
budget/inflation scenario, will free up less than $10 billion in funding by the
late 2030’s
• The high post-ISS funding scenario and the high purchase power scenario,
allowing many 10’s of billions of dollars in funding to be applied to
exploration, Mars, etc. through the 2030s
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Combining Scenario Variables
• Context = a box with 3 sides
“budget” X “inflation” X “future NASA LEO presence”
Content
Procurements
• Direct
• Indirect
• Space transportation
• Spacecraft (cargo, crew)
• Stages (departure, insertion)
• Habitats
• Landers
• Exploration vehicles
• Other elements (science, equipment, etc.)
• Ground operations/launch
• Mission operations/control
• Other support (ScAN, etc.)
Government 
• Program/project management
Context
Budget
In
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at
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n
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Cost Modeling, Historical Data
• Older to Recent
• Cargo to Crew
• Cost+ to commercial
• For proposed scenario elements – preference for recent, commercial data
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Cost Modeling, Historical Data
• Older to Recent
• Cargo to Crew
• Cost+ to commercial
• For proposed scenario elements – preference for recent, commercial data
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Scenarios
• Canvas always the same
• What are the settings? Purchase Power, mission rate, elements?
• What is observed? Challenges? Overages?
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The Interim Scenario – SLS (& ICPS) – Nominal Purchase Power
• Settings: Nominal Purchase Power, 2.0 missions/year
• Number of any launches per year: 2.0
• Observations: Challenges @ 2 flights/year (exceeds blue line 2022-2029); fits
nominal & high post ISS funding availability scenarios, but challenged at low
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Orion Fixed Yearly, REC Orion Variable per Launch, REC
Ground/Launch Site Ops Develop., NREC Ground/Launch Site Ops, REC
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* SLS (minus ICPS) Fixed/variable costs based on Space Shuttle’s documented “Zero Base*” costs (ET, SRB/SRM, Engines) 
per year; adjustments for accounting shifts, year dollars,  larger core, addition of MPS, etc.
See: http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/Shuttle_ZB.htm
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The Baseline Scenario – SLS (& EUS), Orion – Nominal Purchase Power
• Settings: Nominal Purchase Power, 2.0 missions/year
• Number of any launches per year: 2.0
• Observations: Challenges @ 2 flights/year (exceeds blue line 2022-2029); fits high
post ISS funding availability scenarios, but challenged at low & nominal
$0
$2,000
$4,000
$6,000
$8,000
$10,000
$12,000
2015 2017 2019 2021 2023 2025 2027 2029 2031 2033 2035 2037
NASA SLS Develop., NREC NASA SLS Fixed Yearly, REC
NASA SLS Variable per Launch, REC
EDS (EUS or equiv.) Develop., NREC EDS (EUS or equiv.) Manuf., REC Orion Develop., NREC
Orion Fixed Yearly, REC Orion Variable per Launch, REC
Ground/Launch Site Ops Develop., NREC Ground/Launch Site Ops, REC
Government Project Management Government Program Management Indicator Only - Crew Missions START
SLS+Orion+Ground Sys. Budget incl. Gov't Mng'mt ISS Funds All (incl. ISS Ops, incl. Mission Ops) ISS Funds (R&D & Cargo/Crew)
Human Spaceflight Total (w. AES/R&D & SFS)
Life Cycle Costs, RY $M per Year
Cost Bars = All Industry/Procurement+Government as Modeled
Human Exploration & Operations / HEO FY 15 = $7,882M/year.NASA LCC Scenario Model
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The Baseline Scenario – SLS (& EUS), Orion – High Purchase Power
• Settings: High Purchase Power, 2.0 mission/year
• Number of any launches per year: 2.0
• Observations: Challenges @ 2 flights/year (exceeds blue line 2022-2029); fits all
post ISS funding availability scenarios - leaves room for other elements (Mars,
etc.) in high and nominal but little in low
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The Baseline Scenario – SLS (& EUS), Orion – Low Purchase Power
• Settings: Low Purchase Power, 2.0 missions/year
• Number of any launches per year: 2.0
• Observations: More extreme challenges @ 2 flights/year (exceeds blue line 2022-
2029); fits only high post ISS funding availability scenario - leaves no funding for
other elements (Mars, etc.) post-ISS
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Alternate Scenario 1 – Lunar via Commercial & In-space Refueling
• Settings: Nominal Purchase Power, 1.0 mission/year
• Number of any launches per year: 6.0 (4.0 are tankers)
• Observations: Assumes redirection, mixed fleet (ULA/SpaceX); commercial lander,
2 providers; commercial cis-lunar crew spacecraft; fits all post ISS funding
scenarios - room for other elements (Mars, etc.) in high & nominal but little in low
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Alternate Scenario 1 – Same as Prior – Lunar But FH Prices @ 2 providers
• Settings: Nominal Purchase Power, 1.0 mission/year
• Number of any launches per year: 5.0 (3.0 are tankers)
• Observations: Same as prior, but requires that lightening strike twice, a 2nd launch
provider. Repeating NASA investment would not show (too small ~$200M to
NASA)
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“What-if” Scenario – SLS/EUS, Orion and a Mars “What-if 13/2.5”
• Settings: Nominal Purchase Power, 1.0 missions every 4.5 years
• Number of any launches per year: 2.0
• Observations: Mars elements (excluding launch & crew spacecraft) treated as a
“what-if” of $13B development, $2.5B per mission set; does not fit low and
nominal post-ISS funding scenarios, and ~challenged to fit low
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“What-if” Scenario – In-Space Refueling and a Mars “What-if - 13/2.5”
• Settings: Nominal Purchase Power, 1.0 missions every 4.5 years
• Number of any launches per year: 7.1 (5.1 are tankers)
• Observations: Mars elements same as prior; fit all post-ISS funding scenarios (as-if
ISS or variant/private stations continue at current investment levels); challenges
increasing mission rate to every 2 years, but plausible w. nominal post-ISS funding
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Potential LEO Propellant Node (as applied in previous scenarios)
A Propellant Depot at a scale of an Earth departure stage applicable to a Design Reference Architecture 5.0 type Mars
missions, among others. The commonality between a propellant depot and a cryogenic propulsion stage (CPS) would reduce
their development costs while also having the basic manufacturing capability always active, through ongoing production of Earth
departure stages, for when the depot requires replacement at the end of its design life.
Wilhite, A., Chai, P., “Plan B for U.S. Human Space Exploration Program,” American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 
Aug.2014. pp.10.
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The importance of the Scale of the Earth Departure Stage
• From NASA DRA 2009
• Larger
• Smaller
24
“All Our Models Say No” – and Recommendations
• Not here to select a scenario
“All our models say ‘no,’ ” said Elizabeth Robinson, NASA’s chief
financial officer, “even models that have generous affordability
considerations.” 2011
• Change all the context?
• Asks that abundant factors in the world outside NASA change
• Change all the contents?
• Asks that abundant processes and programs inside NASA change
• ALL are non-linear scenarios, with breaks either built in or pending
• Abundant other “non-linear” scenarios left un-explored (events driven, the 
unexpected, failures, crew safety, etc.)
What can we observe of value across
this multi-verse of scenarios?
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Recommendations
Lower the height of the numerous cost $ bars across the life cycle profiles,
increase the mission rates, and sooner, for relevance
• Require all future Points of Departure for new elements be partnerships
• About degrees, not if/or
• Alignment of incentives
• Path to lowering development costs simultaneous with lower per unit 
manufacturing and ground/mission operations costs
• Consistent with improving purchase power regardless of budget scenario
• Require productivity goals that continuously go up, while still fitting context, 
not down (less for less)
• True “pioneering” goes well beyond exploring; this  recommendation is 
consistent with seeking “pioneering” outcomes
• Require NASA acquisitions to favor systems and partners that also grow non-
NASA business
• Amortize costs of element development and maintaining production lines 
over more customers; lower costs through efficiency, alignment of incentives
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Recommendations
Lower the height of the numerous cost $ bars across the life cycle profiles,
increase the mission rates, and sooner, for relevance
• Require increasing reusability of elements
• Less make, less launch of what was made
• Consistent w. prior recommend addressing maintaining manufacturing lines
• Develop refueling capabilities and infrastructure
• If spaceships are to be reused, they will need to be refueled
• Mars (and the solar system) via the Moon, ISRU
• Budget efficiencies (from reuse of emplaced assets, amortizing over many 
uses) & mass (IMLEO) efficiencies
27
Conclusions
• Analysis demonstrated the possibilities and importance of merging context and 
content
• Made possible by merging cost modeling, analysis and scenario planning
• Demonstrated how to avoid the tension between the details and numbers for 
specific paths and being overwhelmed when stepping back to consider all the 
possibilities
• Future applications – a “sequel” - will mature this capability and develop more 
scenarios, emphasizing the recommendations
